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The Impact of International Law on the 
Transformation of China‘s Perception of the 
World: A Lesson from History  
LI ZHAOJIE (JAMES LI)
†
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A nation‘s attitude toward international law stems from its world 
outlook. In this respect, China is no exception. But what makes China 
different from other nations is its unique historical experience. The 
legacy of history shapes the present. We make our own history not 
just as we please, but only ―under circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.‖1 History plays a 
particularly important role in China.2 
Anyone taking a brief look at modern Chinese history will find a 
broad spectrum of earth-shaking and kaleidoscopic changes in the 
modern nation-building process. In the space of one and a half 
centuries, China was reduced by foreign imperialism from its own 
―Middle Kingdom‖ at the center of the universe to a semi-colonial 
society.3 China then emerged as an independent republic and 
 
† Professor of Law, Tsinghua University School of Law, Beijing China. This author is 
greatly indebted to the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law for its 
kind invitation to participate in China, Taiwan and International Law: A Symposium in 
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu on October 6, 2011. This essay is dedicated to the late 
Professor Hungdah Chiu. Professor Chiu was an eminent and revered international law 
scholar. Throughout his life, he made tremendous, multi-dimensional and lasting 
contributions to the teaching, study, and dissemination of international law. His most 
prominent and lasting legacy is his role in promoting peaceful development of the cross-
strait relations between Taiwan and Mainland China. 
 1. Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, reprinted in KARL MARX & 
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 320 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 
1959). 
 2. SAMUEL S. KIM, China and the World in Theory and Practice, in CHINA AND THE 
WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 12 (1994). 
 3. John K. Fairbank, Introduction to THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER 1, 2–5 (John K. 
Fairbank ed., 1970). 
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eventually became a major world power. Concomitant with such 
great changes was the radical and fundamental transformation of the 
Chinese global outlook from a Sino-centric one based on 
Confucianism to modern Chinese nationalism, which embraces the 
idea of sovereign equality and independence.4 
What is the leitmotif is that cuts broadly across the process of 
such transformation? Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, a distinguished historian, 
observed that this transformation is certainly not a passive response 
to the onslaught of the West, but an ―active struggle of the Chinese to 
meet the foreign and domestic challenges in an effort to regenerate 
and transform their country from an outdated Confucian universal 
empire to a modern national state, with a rightful place in the family 
of nations.‖5 This author fully agrees with this observation. From a 
legal perspective, the formation and development of the Chinese 
attitude toward international law is, therefore, a reflection of this 
historical transformation.6 
I. FORMAL INTRODUCTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
CHINA 
Beginning with the Opium War, Western imperialistic invasions 
broke down China‘s Sino-centric world view and replaced it with an 
 
 4. Id. at 1–5. For a long time in history, geographical barriers kept the whole region of 
East Asia separate from the West. To Westerners, East Asia was a remote and seemingly 
inaccessible land at the end of the earth. Even today, in the European parlance, ―the Far 
East‖ still remains in common use. However, the Chinese did not perceive their world the 
same way the Westerners did. The Far Eastern region in Chinese eyes became Tianxia, 
literally, ―all under Heaven,‖ of which China perceived itself to be the very center. Thus, 
China's name, Zhongguo, denoted a sense of ―the central country‖ or Middle Kingdom 
which embraced the whole world known to it. Such traditional Chinese perception of its 
place in the world is what Western historians have meant by the term, ―Sinocentrism,‖ which 
is used to characterize traditional China's relations with other nations generally. Of course, 
China‘s self-image as the center of the world is a false idea in modern geographical terms. 
Throughout history, however, such idea accorded closely with the facts of East Asian 
experience, and had seemed to be reinforced by practical reality. Id. at 1–5. 
 5. IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 14 (1975) [hereinafter HSÜ, RISE]. 
 6. Since time immemorial, the conduct of China's ―foreign affairs‖ had been directed 
under the so-called Sino-centralism based on Chinese cultural supremacy and an idea of all-
embracing unity. See Fairbank, supra note 3, at 2. This traditional world outlook was further 
legitimized by Confucianist political philosophy that advocated peace and harmony in a 
hierarchical and anti-egalitarian social order. See id. at 1. Until the arrival of expansionist 
Western imperialistic powers on the Chinese scene in the middle of the 19th century, China's 
foreign relations had been managed under an indigenous system known as the ―tributary 
system,‖ whereby China, occupying the patriarchal position, assumed the leadership and, in 
return, tributary states came into contact with China as part of the Chinese family of nations, 
but in a subordinate position. Id. at 2–5.  
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unequal treaty regime.7 In the process of destroying the traditional 
Chinese world order and its institutions, the Western powers not only 
used strong warships and efficient guns to ―put down China‘s 
resistance by force,‖ but also endeavored to enlighten the Chinese 
with Western ideas and institutions.8 A significant aspect of this latter 
attempt was the formal introduction of the European system of 
international law into China.9 
After the signing of the Conventions of Peking in 1860, the 
imperial court of the Qing Dynasty accepted the bitter reality that 
China had no alternative but to learn to live with the West.10 As Sino-
Western relations entered a new phase of a decade-long era of peace 
and cooperation, Chinese officials who took charge of foreign affairs 
became aware of the necessity of having some knowledge of 
international law to deal with the West on a regular basis.11 In 1863, a 
leading official of the Office of Foreign Affairs (Zong-li ya-men) 
asked the American Minister, Anson Burlingame, to recommend an 
authoritative work on international law that Western nations 
recognized.12 The Chinese need for international law was further 
evidenced by Prince Gong‘s memorial to the court in August 1864, 
asking for imperial sanction of an appropriation of the printing of the 
translated Henry Wheaton‘s Elements of International law,13 which 
reads in part: 
Your ministers have found that the Chinese spoken and 
written language is learned with care by foreigners without 
exception. Among them, the cleverest go even further and 
immerse themselves in studying Chinese books. When a 
case is argued or discussed, they can usually base 
themselves on Chinese legal codes . . . . Unfortunately, the 
regulations of foreign countries are all written in foreign 
languages and we suffer from being unable to read them. 
And it will still take some time for the students in the Tung-
 
 7. See Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law, 8 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 6 (1984). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See id. at 4. 
 10. See HSÜ, RISE, supra note 5, at 214–19.  
 11. IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, CHINA‘S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 125 (1960) 
[hereinafter HSÜ, ENTRANCE]. 
 12. Id. at 127. 
 13. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1863). In 1861, Prince 
Gong (Yi Xin) was made the chief of the newly founded Tsungli Yamen, commonly known 
to the Western powers as China's Office of Foreign Affairs. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, 
at 108, 125. 
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wen Kuan (School of Foreign Languages) to master the 
foreign languages thoroughly . . . We have learned that 
there is such a book as called Wan-kuoLü-li, ―Laws and 
precedents of all nations.‖ Yet when we wanted to seek it 
directly, and entrust its translation to the foreigners, we 
were afraid that they might wish to keep it confidential and 
not have it shown to us.14 
The Qing court was not alone in realizing the importance of 
learning Western international law. Having seen numerous Chinese 
fumbles in diplomatic transactions, foreigners were also conscious of 
the need of introducing their international law into China so that the 
Chinese officials could comprehend the rules by which a semi-
colonial state was supposed to abide.15 It was William A. P. Martin, 
an American missionary and sinologist, who assumed this task. 
Even when he served as an interpreter to American Minister 
William B. Reed in 1858, Martin came up with the idea of translating 
a work on international law into Chinese.16 He originally intended to 
translate Vattel‘s Le droit des gens when Ward, the American 
minister to China, recommended Wheaton‘s Elements of 
International Law as being more modern and equally authoritative.17 
Wheaton served the United States as a career diplomat in Europe 
for almost two decades. His Elements of International Law, published 
in 1836, was the first systematic and large-scale treatise on 
international law by an Anglo-American author. Based on the 
author‘s rich diplomatic experiences and extensive scholarly studies, 
the book focused on diplomatic transactions, cases, and other 
historical precedents. Wheaton‘s reasoning impressed readers with its 
straightforward style and impartiality and was frequently cited in 
American court decisions and state papers. No less than 15 American 
and English editions have been published.18 This wide readership 
reflected the high esteem that the American conception of 
international law held at the time. 
 
 14. 3 QINGDAI CHOUBAN YIWU SHIMO [HISTORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN 
AFFAIRS OF THE QING DYNASTY], 1184–85 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Press) [hereinafter 
MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS]. For an English translation, see SSU-YÜTENG & JOHN 
K. FAIRBANK, CHINA‘S RESPONSE TO THE WEST, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 1839-1923, at 97–
99 (1965). 
 15. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 126. 
 16. Id. See also W.A.P. MARTIN, A CYCLE OF CATHAY 222 (1897).  
 17. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14. 
 18. Id. at 234–35. 
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In Martin‘s opinion, Wheaton‘s book was a full and impartial 
digest, and as such it found its way into all the cabinets of Europe.19 
Martin felt that the Chinese would benefit from a translation of this 
work.20 
When Martin began his translation in 1862, he was encouraged 
by Robert Hart, then inspector-general of Chinese Customs, and he 
was able to secure the help he needed from Chinese scholars for the 
translation. Originally, Martin wanted to show the Chinese the 
Western concepts and principles by which international relations 
were conducted. He did not expect any sponsorship from the Qing 
court. In the spring of 1863, he wrote to the American Minister, 
Anson Burlingame, proposing to complete the translation so it could 
be used by the Chinese government. Burlingame gave Martin 
encouragement and assured Martin that he would assist him in 
bringing the translation before the officials of the Qing court. In June 
of that year, Martin set out for the north and brought the translated 
passage with him. At Tianjin, he was met by the Qing court minister-
superintendent of trade. Looking over Wheaton‘s manuscript, the 
minister-superintendent was impressed with its acknowledgement of 
the needs of China in handling its new relationships, and promised to 
write on the subject to the court.21 
Through Burlingame‘s efforts, Martin obtained an interview 
with four top officials of the Court‘s Office of Foreign Affairs on 
September 11, 1863.22 The Office welcomed the manuscript right 
away. ―This will be our guide when we send envoys to foreign 
countries,‖ one of them said.23 Martin assured the officials that ―this 
book would be appropriate reading for all countries having treaty 
relations. But because its text [the Chinese version] and meaning do 
not go very intelligible and satisfactory, he requested our [Chinese] 
corrections and revision for the purpose of publication.‖24 
Prince Gong had already learned about the translation from 
Burlingame and was secretly anxious to read it. Upon studying it, he 
found it useful but hard to comprehend, as he later reported to the 
court: 
 
 19. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 127. 
 20. Id.  
 21. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 222, 233–34. 
 22. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 127–28. 
 23. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 233. 
 24. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1185. 
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Examining this book, I found it generally deals with 
alliances, laws of war, and other things. Particularly it has 
laws on the outbreak of war and the check and balance 
between states. Its words and sentences are confused and 
disorderly; we cannot clearly understand it unless it is 
explained in person.25 
Eventually, four secretaries of the Court‘s Office of Foreign 
Affairs were appointed by the prince to help edit the text. After 
nearly six months of editing, the Chinese translation of Martin‘s 
manuscript was finally completed in the winter of 1864. The book is 
prefaced by a two-page essay describing the various nations in the 
world, followed by two simple maps of the Eastern and Western 
hemispheres that do not appear in the original Wheaton.26 It also 
contains two Chinese forewords.27 
Although the edited Chinese text is in good, semi-classical style, 
which posed no problem for the Chinese literati,28 the accuracy of 
Martin‘s translation still leaves much to be desired by today‘s 
standards. In fact, Martin‘s work is not a translations in the strictest 
sense, but rather a paraphrased interpretation of Wheaton, which 
strongly reflects the translator‘s own perspective of international 
law.29 Many Chinese terms were presented by the translator in an 
imprecise, though understandable manner, and are outdated today.30 
Moreover, at times Martin‘s renditions were so free that they actually 
constituted explanations rather than translations; for instance, 
―Congress of Verona‖ was rendered as ―Four countries controlling 
Spain.‖31 Hsü also compares an excerpt of Martin‘s work with the 
original passage from Wheaton, in which the lack of universality of 
international law is discussed. Wheaton, after quoting the views of 
Grotius, Bynkershoeck, Leibnitz, and Montesquieu, says: 
There is then, according to these writers, no universal 
law of nations, such as Cicero describes in his treatise De 
Republica, binding upon the whole human race—which all 
mankind in all ages and countries, ancient and modern, 
 
 25. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 128. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 134. 
 28. Id. at 129. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. Hsü in his book gives a short list as an example to show discrepancies between 
the terms used by Martin and those used at the present time. Id. at 130. 
 31. Id.  
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savage and civilized, Christian and Pagan, have recognized 
in theory or in practice, have professed to obey, or have in 
fact obeyed.‖32 
Martin‘s rendition of this paragraph, when literally re-translated 
into English, reads as follows: 
Judging from them there is no universally practiced 
law as is said in Te-li [De Republica], for there has never 
been a case that is accepted by all nations at all times, 
barbarian or civilized, within or without the Church.33 
Such imprecise translations, according to Hsü, ran through the 
book. 
Nonetheless, Martin‘s work is still praiseworthy, if one considers 
the fact that the general meaning of the original Wheaton is not lost. 
The book is titled Wanguo Gongfa (萬國公法) in Chinese, meaning 
Public Law of All Nations, because Martin held that international law 
―is commonly used in various nations and is not a monopoly of any 
single state. Moreover, it is like the laws and regulations of the 
various states, hence it is also called Wanguo Lü-li (萬國律例),‖ 
meaning laws and regulations of all nations.34 Today, however, the 
term ―international law‖ is translated as Guoji Fa (国际法), or the 
law between states, a term created by Dr. Mitsukuri Rinsho of Japan 
in 1873 after Martin‘s translation was introduced there in 1865.35 
II. REACTIONS TO THE FORMAL INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTO CHINA 
While Martin‘s manuscript was in the process of being edited at 
the Office of Foreign Affairs in 1864, a diplomatic incident occurred 
that gave Chinese officials an opportunity to test the usefulness of 
Western international law.36 In that year, Otto von Bismarck‘s 
Prussia fought Denmark in the Second Schleswig War. In March, the 
Prussian minister to China, Guido von Rehfues, known to the 
Chinese as Li Fusi, arrived in China on a warship. Finding three 
Danish merchant ships off Dagu Kou (a sea port near Tianjin), von 
Rehfues seized them as a war prize. After that, he sent a letter to the 
 
 32. WHEATON, supra note 13, at 17. 
 33. W.A.P. MARTIN, WANGGUO GONGFA [Public Law of All Nations] 61.  
 34. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 129.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 132.  
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superintendent of trade at Tianjin, giving notice of his arrival and 
asking for a date to be received by the Office of Foreign Affairs. 
Upon the report of both the request and the seizure, the Office 
immediately protested the Prussian minister‘s action. The protest was 
motivated by the fear that if China remained indifferent towards the 
seizure, it would constitute China‘s acquiescence to the claim that the 
area of water in question was the high seas, which, according to 
Western international law, belongs to no country.37 Prince Gong 
explained this to the court: 
Foreign countries have the view, that oceans and seas over 
10 li [one marine league] from the coast, where it is beyond 
the reach of guns and cannon, are common area of all 
countries. [The ships of] any country may come and go or 
stay in that area at will.38 
The Office of Foreign Affairs insisted that the seizure of the 
Danish ships took place in China‘s ―inner ocean,‖ a Chinese 
equivalent to the Western term of ―territorial sea‖ and constituted an 
extension of a European war to an area under China‘s exclusive 
jurisdiction. Prussian minister von Rehfues argued that the European 
law of war allowed the seizure because it was far enough from the 
Chinese coast. To this, Prince Gong replied that the place was not the 
high seas but China‘s territorial waters: 
The various [inner] oceans under China‘s jurisdiction 
have, as a rule, been specifically stipulated in all her peace 
treaties with the foreign nations, and in the peace treaty 
with your nation, there is such a term as ‗Chinese ocean.‘ 
You know this more clearly than any other country and 
how can you say it is beyond your comprehension? As to 
the European law of war, China cannot be obliged to know 
all.39 
Prince Gong further argued that the detention of ships that 
belonged to one foreign country in China‘s territorial waters by 
another foreign country engaged in hostilities with the former was an 
act of ―despising China‖ and that the Chinese protest was ―not for 
Denmark but for preserving China‘s rights.‖40 Prince Gong 
 
 37. Id. at 133.  
 38. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1144.  
 39. HSÜ, supra note 11, at 133. Martin translated ‗maritime territory‘ as ―ocean area 
within the jurisdiction of a nation,‖ a less concise definition than ―inner ocean.‖ Id. 
 40. Id. 
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reinforced his protest by notifying the Prussian minister that these 
actions were unacceptable to China and, unless the three Danish ships 
were released, no reception of the Prussian minister would be 
possible. Von Rehfues saw the seriousness of the situation, released 
the Danish ships and paid a compensation of $1,500 for the third. The 
incident ended peacefully. 
The Chinese officials that handled this dispute did not expressly 
quote Wheaton‘s book with respect to jurisdiction over territorial 
waters. But it is beyond doubt that Martin‘s translation of Wheaton‘s 
Elements of International Law influenced their combined use of the 
principle of territorial waters, China‘s treaty relations with the West, 
and the refusal to recognize von Rehfues‘ ministerial status.41 This 
diplomatic victory thus proved the usefulness of Martin‘s manuscript. 
By this time, Prince Gong was ready to submit to the court a 
memorial, asking for its sanction of an appropriation for the printing 
and distribution of Martin‘s translation. In the memorial, Prince Gong 
stated: 
Your ministers find that [the contents of this] book on 
foreign laws and regulations is not basically in complete 
agreement with the Chinese systems, it nevertheless 
contains sporadic useful points. For instance, in connection 
with Prussia‘s detention of the Danish ships in Tientsin 
harbor this year, your ministers covertly used statements 
from that law book in arguing with [Von Rehfues]. 
Thereby, the Prussian minister acknowledge his mistake 
and bowed his head without further contention. This seems 
[conclusive of its usefulness].42 
The imperial sanction was duly granted: five hundred taels (a 
varying unit of weight used in East Asia, usually one tael is around 
38 grams, or 1.75 ounces) were appropriated for publication and three 
hundred copies were distributed to the provinces for the use of local 
officials. 
The immediate Chinese response to Wheaton‘s work was far 
from encouraging. Although they were satisfied with the work done 
by Martin and Burlingame, the officials in the Office of Foreign 
Affairs were worried about the true intentions of these foreigners. 
They were also skeptical of the value of the book as a whole. They 
feared that this product of seemingly useful Western legal learning 
 
 41. See id. at 133–34.  
 42. Id. at 134. 
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might be a Trojan Horse.43 The Chinese mistrust accounts for why, in 
handling the case of the seizure of the Danish ships, they did not 
expressly quote Wheaton as authority to support their arguments.44 
Such mentality was evident if one looks into Prince Gong‘s same 
memorial: 
[Martin said] that it (this book) should be read by all 
countries having treaty relations with others. In case of 
dispute it can be taken for reference and can be quoted . . . . 
Your ministers forestalled his attempt to get us to follow 
this book, by telling him at once that China has her own 
laws and institutions and that it is inconvenient to consult 
foreign books. Martin, however, points out that although 
the Ta-Ching Lü-Li has now been translated by foreign 
countries, China has never compelled foreign countries to 
act by it. It cannot be that when a foreign book is translated 
into Chinese, China should be forced to follow it. Thus he 
has pleaded repeatedly . . . . 
Your ministers think that his purpose is two-fold, 
firstly, to boast that foreign countries also have laws, and 
secondly, to imitate men like Matteo Ricci in making a 
name in China.45 
Thus, it is apparent that their deep-rooted suspicions of the West, 
coupled with their diehard image of the traditional Chinese universal 
overlordship,46 made it difficult for the Chinese officials to accept 
international law as a body of legal principles and rules for regulating 
relations between states on the basis of sovereign equality and 
independence. Chinese officials‘ need for the introduction of Western 
international law did not stem from their belief in the value of the 
legal system per se; instead, they viewed their study of Western law 
 
 43. T.F. Tsiang, Bismarck and the Introduction of International Law into China, 15 
CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 98, 100 (1931). 
 44. Id. Tsiang maintains that with or without the translation of Wheaton, the Yamen 
officials would have protested against extending the sphere of Prussian-Danish military 
activities to Chinese waters, but with Wheaton before them, they found their own wishes 
supported not only by Chinese practice but also by a body of laws which Western nations 
called ―international.‖ With this additional support, they pressed their case all the more 
strongly. Id. at 101. 
 45. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14. 
 46. See Li Zhaojie (James Li), Traditional Chinese World Outlook, 1 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 
20, 53 (2002). This is an expression used to characterize the traditional Chinese perception 
of the world, which assumed that China remained the center of civilization and that the 
Chinese form of civilization was superior. Id. Noticeably, such superiority was not one of 
more material power but of culture. Id. at 25.  
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as a study of the enemy. As Hsü observes, knowing ―one‘s enemy 
was the first step toward winning the battle.‖47  
Along the line of playing off the Western barbarians against one 
another Prince Gong entered his measured conclusion in his masterly 
memorial: ―This book (Martin‘s translation) contains quite a few 
ways of controlling and bridling the consuls which may be useful . . . 
.‖48 
Indeed, Western international law was ―not basically in complete 
agreement with the Chinese system.‖49 Acceptance of this exotic 
legal learning of Western barbarians would amount to the 
abandonment of the long-honored traditional Chinese systems and 
institutions. Amid the strong xenophobic atmosphere of the era, even 
a very narrow-minded pragmatic attitude toward the usefulness of 
international law had to be couched in precautionary terms to avoid 
possible attacks from the die-hard conservatives of the court.  
However, the publication of the translated Wheaton‘s Elements 
of International Law marked the beginning of the systematic and 
formal introduction of Western international law into China. It was 
an epoch-making event in that it ―enabled the Chinese to have a first 
glimpse of what was called international law in the West.‖50 It 
signified China‘s open recognition of the existence of strong and 
independent nations beyond China. Given the time-honored and 
persistent Chinese claim to universal overlordship, this recognition 
amounted to a significant departure from their traditional perception 
of the world. Regardless of his motivation, Martin‘s contribution to 
this great event has had a lasting effect. As a reward for Martin‘s 
pace-setting undertakings, the Qing court appointed him president 
and professor of international law at China‘s first foreign language 
school, Tongwen Guan (serving from 1869 until 1894) and the first 
chancellor of the Imperial University of Peking (serving from 1898 
until 1900), the predecessor of today‘s Peking University.51 Martin 
also received many other high honors from the Chinese. 
As for foreigners, the formal introduction of Western 
international law into China met with a mixed response. Believing 
that international law was the best fruit of Western civilization, 
 
 47. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 135. 
 48. MANAGEMENT OF BARBARIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 1185. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Chen, supra note 7, at 6. 
 51. HSÜ, ENTRANCE, supra note 11, at 136 
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Martin saw his translation of Wheaton as a vehicle for bringing the 
heathen Chinese government closer to Christianity. Thus, upon 
learning of the Chinese success in applying their knowledge of 
international law to the case of the seizure of the Danish ships, he 
heartily congratulated the Chinese on their ability to digest new 
concepts and ideas which had been hardly known to them in the past 
two thousand years.52 Martin even thought that his work might ―stand 
second in influence to the translation of the Bible!‖53 
In keeping with Martin‘s optimistic tone, Burlingame signaled 
his approval by telling the U.S. State Department about Martin‘s 
remarkable success ―in getting the Chinese government to adopt and 
publish Wheaton‘s international law.‖54 Secretary of State William 
Seward praised Burlingame for what he had done, and was thrilled 
that China was inclined to respect the obligations of international 
law.55 He said that ―the learning and zeal of the Chinese Government 
in connection with this matter cannot be too highly commended.‖56 
The British minister in Beijing, Frederick Bruce, lent his support and 
encouragement to Martin from the beginning, saying that ―the work 
would do good by showing the Chinese that the nations of the West 
have principles by which they are guided, and that force is not their 
only law.‖57 A Russian minister told Burlingame that his government 
wished to see China become closer with the family of nations and 
subject to the obligations of international law.58 
While these Western diplomats viewed Martin‘s work positively, 
others strongly condemned the formal introduction of Western 
international law into China. They were horrified that China might be 
in possession of some elementary knowledge of international law.59 
Indeed, Martin reported that M. Klecskowsky, chargé d’affairs at the 
French legation, shouted to Burlingame: ―Who is this man who is 
going to give the Chinese an insight into our European international 
law? Kill him—choke him off; he will make us endless trouble.‖60 
The unofficial Western trading community in China was also 
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ambivalent towards the work. As the self-appointed vanguard and 
promoters of Western civilization in the East, they assumed a 
patronizing attitude towards the Chinese acceptance of their 
international law. On the other hand, as beneficiaries of the unequal 
treaty regime, they were apprehensive that supplying the Chinese a 
legal instrument might be used to roll back the newly acquired 
political and commercial privileges and to prevent the exaction of 
further concessions.61 A North China Herald article characteristically 
reflects this ambivalent sentiment: 
Whether we are supplying weapons, which may at some 
future period be directed against ourselves, or which will 
only be turned to the acquisition of new conquests, cannot 
at present be decided. To stem the stream while it is still 
near its source, and guide it into proper channels should 
now be our aim.62 
Indeed, as indicated by this short passage, foreign residents in 
China began to regret that the Chinese had discovered ―those flowery 
means of diplomacy where they so highly excelled‖ and admitted that 
―we must make up our minds to see the Chinese in future contesting 
acts to which they are opposed on grounds which we ourselves 
recognize.‖63 
III. FAILURE TO APPLY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DEFENSE OF CHINA‘S 
INTERESTS 
In 1867, Martin returned to the United States for two years to 
study international law and political economy at the University of 
Indiana, where he earned a doctorate.64 After he returned to China in 
1869, the Qing court designated him president of the T’ung-wen 
kuan.65 Martin added a variety of subjects to the eight-year 
curriculum, including international law.66 In 1879, the school 
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enrolled nine students in the program of international law,67 and in 
time it produced a number of distinguished diplomats.68 China also 
began to send students to Europe and America to study a variety of 
topics including international law. Ma Jianzhong, for example, 
pursued a doctoral degree in international law in France from 1876 to 
1879. After returning to China, he provided valuable service in 
international affairs to Viceroy Li Hung-chang.69 His expertise in 
international law apparently helped the Office of Foreign Affairs 
avoid many possible diplomatic blunders. 
Sino-Western relations during the second half of the nineteenth 
century forced Chinese officials to abandon their traditional attitude 
towards foreign relations and to learn to conduct foreign affairs on 
the basis of international law. In 1864, Ding Jichang, the Shanghai 
Daotai, skillfully and firmly rejected several extra-legal commercial 
requests from foreigners by declaring that China had no treaty-based 
legal obligations to honor such requests.  
In 1873, Viceroy Li Hongzhang cited Wheaton‘s words of how 
newly arrived diplomats present their credentials to persuade 
Emperor Tongzhi to receive foreign diplomats. Li‘s advice soothed 
the emperor‘s fear that he might personally have to negotiate with the 
foreigners and that open dispute might occur at the court. Wheaton‘s 
teachings also guided the Chinese through the conclusion of a 
commercial treaty with Peru in 1874. During the negotiation the 
Chinese officials insisted on reciprocal most-favored-nation 
treatment, as recommended by Wheaton.  
Beginning in 1876, China sent its permanent diplomatic 
representatives abroad. While treaties formed the basis of many of 
these legations, those in Washington and St. Petersburg were 
noticeably not. The American and Russian Treaties of Tianjin merely 
stipulated the right of the United States and Russia to establish 
legations in China, without giving China the right to reciprocate. 
Thus, the Chinese legation in the United States and Russia rested on 
the general principles of international law, not on treaties.70 
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By the 1880s, China had established diplomatic legations in the 
most of the leading Western nations.71 China was also invited to 
attend the sixth meeting of the Association for the Reform and 
Codification of the Law of Nations in 1878.72  
This association, founded in Brussels in 1873, expressed a strong 
interest in extending international law to the Far East in 1876 and 
1877 and invited China and Japan to participate in its future 
meetings. Guo Songtao, China‘s first minister to England, 
represented China and praised the association for its efforts to 
improve the law of nations ―for the benefit of all governments and 
peoples.‖73 He said he was ―very desirous of attaining a knowledge of 
the science, in the hope that it will be beneficial to my country‖ even 
though China did not fully recognize the rules of international law. 
The Association elected Guo as honorary vice-president in 
recognition of China‘s inclusion. The Association later elected Guo‘s 
successor in London, Zeng Jize, a famous Chinese diplomat of the 
time, to the same post.74 
Despite disagreements and divergent views on international law 
among Western writers, China often referred to Western international 
law in conducting its foreign affairs and indicated its willingness to 
learn more about the new field.75 By the time the Qing dynasty was 
overthrown in 1911, China had become a participant in the Western 
state system and was conversant with its institutions, processes, and 
norms.76 China also attended the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907 and joined the Universal Postal Union. Hence, this period 
of modern Chinese history saw the growth of the need for more 
knowledge of international law.77 
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It is beyond doubt that, through these translations, Chinese 
officials improved their knowledge of international law. Moreover, 
their limited diplomatic experience also tended to vindicate 
usefulness of international law as an instrument for defending 
China‘s interests.78  
Many Chinese officials were even entranced by the idea of the 
omnipotence of international law. Guo Songtao, for example, was a 
great enthusiast of international law, believing that China must rely 
on international law and the treaty system while dealing with other 
nations.79 He made favorable comments on international law in his 
Chronicles of a Mission to the West: ―[The Western powers] created 
the law of nations; they emulate with each other in faithfulness and 
righteousness, and lay particular emphasis on friendship among 
nations; they are reasonable and courteous; they add decorum to 
substance; they are far better than the states during the Spring and 
Autumn period.‖80 
Cheng Kuan-ying, a compradore-reformer of the time, had such 
high regard for international law that he discussed the topic in the 
very first essay of his book on reform, I-yen. He examined the 
principles and usefulness of international law in greater detail in later 
editions.81  
Another exemplary advocate of international law was Viceroy Li 
Hongzhang, who, for a long time, was in charge of China‘s foreign 
affairs. In his foreword to the translated Hall‘s Treatise on 
International Law, he stated: ―Public [international] law is the law of 
all the nations in the world. When the law is abided by, the world is 
in order; when the law is violated, the world is in chaos.‖ In his 
opinion, Hall‘s treatise ―presents the law clearly and fairly, and 
should be looked up to as the standard by [Chinese] negotiators in the 
future.‖ 
In order to enforce international law, Chen Qiu, another public 
figure in the reform-minded literati, proposed in 1893 that the 
world‘s nations establish a world organization. He predicted that his 
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proposal would materialize in thirty years. In 1898, Pi Yung-nien and 
T‘ang Ts‘ai-ch‘ang established a small society known as the 
Association of International Law Studies.82  
Kang Youwei, the leader of the 1898 radical reform movement 
(One-Hundred-Day Reform), also felt that China‘s foreign relations 
should be established on the international law principles of sovereign 
equality and independence. According to him, ―[i]n the whole earth, 
China is only one of fifty-six countries,‖ and ―[t]oday [the states of 
the world] compete with each other rather like [the separate Chinese 
states] at the period of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States 
(722–221 BCE), and there is no longer a unified rule as under the 
Han, Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties.‖83 Therefore, Kang believed 
that different nations on the earth should possess equal rights in 
dealing with each other. On that basis, he advocated that the Qing 
court should reject the traditional Sino-centric world view and should 
follow international law in dealing with other countries.84 
Yet this candle of the Western legal learning did not light much 
of the darkness. Despite the improvement of their knowledge of 
international law, Chinese officials failed to make active use of this 
exotic legal learning in throwing off the yoke of the unequal treaty 
regime. As illustrated by Hsü, reasons for such failure were 
multidimensional.85 
First and foremost, effective application of international law for 
recovering China‘s lost interests and rights would require abandoning 
the traditional Chinese ways of thinking and the time-honored 
Chinese tizhi (basic structure of the state and society).86 
Unfortunately, the Chinese officials were by no means ready to do 
that. The die-hard conservatives at the court, who powerfully 
manipulated public opinion, vehemently attacked the introduction of 
international law into China. ―They asserted that they had heard of 
transforming the barbarians by the Chinese way of life, but never of 
changing the Chinese with the barbarians‘ ways,‖ wrote Hsü.87 As 
self-claimed defenders of the Chinese heritage and jealous guardians 
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of the principles of the Chinese li, they denounced the acceptance of 
international law as an un-Chinese activity, traitorous to the national 
tradition and un-filial to the ancestors. 
Thus, those who showed interest in this body of the Western 
learning would risk being condemned as advocates of Westernization 
and envoys to the West. They were seen by opponents of 
international law as ―ingratiating themselves with foreigners,‖ 
―serving the barbarians,‖ ―having clandestine relations with the 
enemy,‖ or ―sinners against Confucian heritage.‖88 Such a strong 
anti-foreign attitude does not appear to have stemmed ―from a 
realization of the dangers of [Western] imperialism, but from a 
feeling of insecurity about their privileged position.‖89 
Self-motivated anti-foreignism arguments successfully created 
the impression that foreign affairs were a dangerous business and to 
associate with it was to betray one‘s decency. Thus, in his preface to 
Martin‘s translation of Wheaton, Zhang Sigui, a member of the 
Office of Foreign Affairs, had to compare the leading Western 
nations to the contending states of the Warring States Period in 
ancient China, which were considered heresy in some quarters.90 
Moreover, even though the more progressive mandarins realized that 
the Western challenge was inescapable and that China must learn 
from the ―barbarians‖ if it was to survive, they saw the value of 
Western international law only within the context of maintaining and 
strengthening the traditional Chinese way of life and institutions.91 
Accordingly, international law was regarded no more useful than 
restraining ―wild‖ foreign consuls and avoiding diplomatic faux 
pas.92 Such limited application of international law could by no 
means forestall further aggression of foreign imperialism, let alone 
recover China‘s lost rights and interests.  
In addition to the lack of political will, the failure to apply 
international law for the defense of China‘s rights and interests was 
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attributable also to the unfavorable cultural milieu.93 The traditional 
Chinese perception of the world order never developed the concept of 
state sovereignty in its modern sense. Law was primarily considered 
as personal rather than territorial. Such ideas as territorial jurisdiction 
or national rights were thus characteristically lacking in the Chinese 
management of foreign relations. Within this historical context, the 
Chinese accepted doctrines, rules, and practices of Western 
international law as their temporary and expedient response to the 
challenge posed by expanding foreign imperialist powers. As Hsü 
points out, the Chinese granted foreign powers privileges, such as 
extraterritoriality, one-sided most-favored-nation treatment, fixed 
tariffs, free navigation of China‘s internal waters, and leased 
territories at many port cities in China without any sense of serious 
loss of China‘s state sovereignty and national rights.94 
Of course, no one was ready and willing to make these 
concessions that would be otherwise condemned as gross violations 
of the principle of state sovereignty in the twentieth century. In fact, 
the Manchu rulers bitterly resented being forced to grant foreign 
powers these concessions at gun point, for it hurt the Chinese pride. 
Yet, the Chinese officials did not regret the loss of these rights as 
much as they regretted the way in which they were lost. As a result, 
their desire for revenge was far stronger than their will to recover the 
loss of rights. Confining themselves to this historical tradition, 
Chinese officials merely realized the usefulness of international law 
for restraining the ―wild‖ foreign consuls, but they never attempted to 
go further to challenge the basic raison d’être of their ―wildness.‖95 
Years later, even when the evils of these concessions became all 
too obvious, the Chinese officials still failed to take active measures 
to remove them.96 The historical experience taught the Chinese that 
external troubles were caused mainly by internal weakness.97 Thus, 
―[i]f China was strong, barbarian problems would be solved before 
they arose.‖98 Under such historical guidance, the more urgent and 
basic solution to the barbarian problem was to put China‘s own house 
in order under the Self-Strengthening Movement rather than to make 
piecemeal efforts to apply Western international law to recover 
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China‘s lost rights and to rescind the unequal treaty regime.99 ―[A]t a 
time when foreign assistance and cooperation were needed for self-
strengthening and the suppression of domestic rebellions, a 
movement to cut foreigners‘ privileges would be impolitic.‖100 
The Alcock Convention of 1869, the first ―equal‖ treaty that 
China negotiated with a Western power, best illustrates this attitude. 
The convention officially revised the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin with 
England. China could have taken this opportunity to apply its 
knowledge of international law in an attempt to remove 
extraterritoriality, the most-favored-nation clause, and the tariff 
restrictions from the treaty, but made no such attempt. They merely 
tried to improve the conditions within the framework of the treaty. As 
a result, the revised treaty only made moderate changes to the most-
favored-nation clause and tariff restriction.101  
But the Office of Foreign Affairs already felt gratified with their 
―accomplishments.‖102 Of course, what they had accomplished turned 
out to be nothing but paltry amelioration within the vast yoke of the 
unequal treaty regime. No attempt was ever made to throw off the 
yoke itself. Little wonder that the British minister Rutherford Alcock 
saw it as ―a matter of congratulations‖ that the Chinese did not ―insist 
upon‖ the abolition of consular extraterritorial jurisdiction, which 
was known to be their ―cardinal‖ desire.103 According to his 
judgment, ―no country or Western government has ever before made 
such liberal concessions to foreign trade.‖104 
By the late nineteenth century, it became all too evident that the 
Qing dynasty by and large had fallen into an irretrievable decline.105 
Internal rebellion and external aggression and humiliation, coupled 
with political mismanagement, had so weakened and degraded the 
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dynasty that its imminent failing was just a matter of time.106 In the 
time of what the Chinese call ―the pre-ordained finale,‖ survival, 
rather than improvement of its lot, became the most central and 
urgent concern.107 With diplomatic failures coming one after another, 
a sense of futility regarding China‘s position set in.108 Thus, their 
eventual mastery of international law made the Chinese increasingly 
aware of the limited value of this legal learning for a country which 
lacked the military, political, and economic power to defend itself.109 
Cui Guoying, a Chinese diplomat, said in his Diary of a Mission to 
the United States, Japan and Peru: ―International law is just like 
Chinese statutory law—reasonable but unreliable. If there is right 
without might, the right will not prevail.‖110 Such a sentiment of 
futility was also characteristically expressed by Zheng Guanying, a 
reformer at that time: 
Public [international] law draws its force from unreliable 
principles. Whereas powerful [states] can enforce it to 
restrain [the wrong-doers], weak [states] are bound to 
forebear being wronged. Thus, only by working with a will 
to make itself strong will a nation be benefited by it 
[international law]; if a nation remains weak and dejected, 
how can it be helped by international law?111 
The pervasive feeling of helplessness made the Chinese fear that 
any attempt to invoke international law to recover China‘s lost rights 
would necessarily entail a treaty revision, which in turn would place 
China in an even more disadvantageous position, for it might open 
new opportunities for foreigners to exact more demands. Thus, the 
Chinese had no desire, let alone concrete plans, to take advantage of 
their knowledge of international law to assert China‘s sovereign 
rights and to abrogate the unequal treaty regime. They directed their 
energy and attention to ferret out the foreigners‘ next moves in order 
to devise means of blocking them. They had a pious hope that China 
could be left alone to work out its salvation in its own way. The best 
they could do was to keep the status quo by persuading foreigners to 
adhere to the existing treaty system and by citing international law to 
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avoid diplomatic faux pas which otherwise might give foreigners the 
pretext to exact new demands.112 
Within this passive and defensive atmosphere, Chinese officials 
regarded treaty revision as a one-way affair.113 It was an occasion 
only for the foreigners to make new demands, not for the Chinese to 
reduce the foreigners‘ rights. All China could do was to bargain with 
the foreigners about the new concessions.114 Even reform-minded and 
well-informed officials, such as Li Hongzhang, took the view that 
once the treaty ratifications were exchanged, nothing more could be 
done about it.115 Guo Songtao had the shallow belief that, in dealing 
with foreign nations, China must rely on international law and the 
treaty system imposed upon China by foreign powers.116 As he wrote 
in 1866, ―[i]f Westerners abide by the treaties whereas we do not, 
then the injustice rests with us.‖117 When the Chinese came to realize 
that treaty revision could also be two-way affair and used in China‘s 
favor, political considerations seem to have prevented them from 
employing such dynamic maneuvers.118 
In 1888, for instance, the United States enacted the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, which violated the four Sino-American treaties 
concluded between 1844 and 1880. As such, China could have 
justifiably taken counter measures by refusing to honor those treaties. 
The Chinese minister to Washington pointed out that the American 
violation of an important treaty stipulation released China from the 
duty to observe all its previous treaties with the United States. The 
United States recognized that China was entitled to denounce these 
treaties. However, the Chinese officials‘ fear of trouble was so 
overwhelming that they did not even consider using the opportunity 
to denounce those unequal treaties or at least revise them to China‘s 
advantage by invoking the principle of rebus sic statibus.119 
Viewed from a larger perspective, the reason for the Chinese 
failure to apply international law in defense of China‘s interests may 
lie in its failure to adequately cope with the Western impact and to 
initiate modern reforms. Until the end of the nineteenth century, there 
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was a conspicuous absence of internal efforts to turn the country into 
a modern nation state.  
There was only a strong and deep, if subdued, vindictive 
desire to avenge the burning of the Summer Palace and the 
hurried flight of the Emperor Xian Feng to Rehe in 1860. 
One day, the mandarins rationalized, the self-strengthening 
movement would enable China to efface these dynastic 
humiliations and drive away the foreign devils, but until 
that day the [unequal] treaties must be endured as facts of 
life.120  
Thus, in the days when might was stronger than right, and without the 
dynamic motivating and supporting power of nationalism, 
international law could hardly serve as an effective legal weapon to 
recover China‘s lost sovereign rights and to bar further aggression of 
foreign imperialism. Its only conceivable function was as a 
diplomatic reference book that the Chinese officials might use to 
restrain the ―wild‖ and ―craftiest‖ foreign consuls and avoid 
diplomatic blunders. 
Of course, another factor that helps explain the Chinese failure to 
use international law in recovering China‘s lost rights and asserting 
its sovereign equality and independence was the attitude of Western 
powers toward international law in their relations with China. In this 
respect, the prevailing view of the West in the nineteenth century was 
much like the antique Chinese zoning theory in that ―humanity in its 
present condition divides itself into three concentric zones or 
spheres—that of civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity and 
that of savage humanity.‖121  
To these three zones, or spheres, the ―civilized nations‖ accorded 
three types of recognitions: ―plenary political recognition, partial 
political recognition and natural or mere human recognition.‖122 The 
sphere of plenary political recognition extended to European and 
American states, along with their colonies that were inhabited by 
white men.123 The sphere of partial political recognition extended to 
Turkey, Persia, China, Siam, and Japan.124 The rest of mankind 
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belonged to the sphere of mere human recognition: ―It is with the first 
of these spheres alone that the international jurist has directly to 
deal.‖125 Countries like China did not belong to the category of the 
so-called ―civilized‖ nations, which were not bound to apply the 
positive law of nations to savages or even to barbarians as such.126  
As alleged by the 1916 edition of Wheaton‘s Elements of 
International Law, China ―lacks certain attributes essential to regular 
and complete membership of the family of States, governed by, and 
enjoying the privileges of, the system of general international law.‖127 
Oppenheim in his 1905 edition of International Law affirmed this 
view, except that he down-graded the position of China even 
further.128 He divided states into five classes: (1) European states; (2) 
American states, Liberia and Haiti; (3) Turkey; (4) Japan; (5) Persia, 
Siam, China, Korea, and Abyssinia.129 As to the fifth class, he 
remarked:  
However, their civilization has not yet reached that 
condition which is necessary to enable their governments 
and their population in every respect to understand and to 
carry out the command of the rules of International Law.130 
Based on this Eurocentric theory, which justified Western 
imperialist and colonial expansion, the ―uncivilized‖ were excluded 
from the operation and benefits of the whole system of international 
law. The Western powers introduced this Western legal learning into 
China, but they did so only as part of their efforts to destroy the 
traditional Chinese world order and place China under the 
domination of the Western world order. As a contemporary Chinese 
historian puts it, the Western powers attempted make the Chinese 
follow the rules that a semi-colonial state was supposed to follow.131 
As early as 1834, Lord Napier of Great Britain advised his 
government before his death: ―I feel satisfied your lordship will see 
the urgent necessity of negotiating with such a [Chinese] government, 
having in your hands at the same time the means of compulsion; to 
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negotiate with them otherwise would be an idle waste of time.‖132 
These words would guide the action of foreign imperialists in their 
expansion and aggression in China. Every foreign government—
British, French, Russian, German, or Japanese—that had come in 
conflict with China from 1839 to 1945 followed these words. 
Thus, in their actual pursuit of interests in China, foreign 
imperialist powers rarely took international law into account. They 
first opened China, put down its resistance by force, and then 
imposed on it unequal treaties at gun point. They conducted all 
relations with China by reference to these unequal treaties. Although 
their demands were often couched in terms of the Western system of 
international law, they never intended to apply the law to their 
relations with China as they did among themselves. Their application 
of international law can only be interpreted as being based upon the 
belief that China had no rights worth their respect and that they were 
free to impose upon China their terms, which had to be accepted 
without China‘s demur. It was against this background that 
international law was first formally introduced into China. It was not 
an easy introduction. It was nothing less than a traumatic encounter 
that created lasting memories of humiliation, domination, and 
oppression by foreign powers under the unequal treaty regime. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, international law, so vital and 
beneficial to the relations among states with a European background, 
proved more destructive than constructive to the Chinese. Having 
experienced decades of foreign aggression and humiliation, the 
Chinese could hardly find reasons to trust that the Western powers 
would apply international law in an even-handed manner while 
dealing with China. 
It was the challenge of survival in the face of national 
subjugation and extinction at the hands of Western imperialism that 
forced the Chinese to accept such international law concepts as 
sovereignty, nation, state, independence, and equality. In the Chinese 
quest for national salvation and regeneration, external aggression as 
invited by the internal decay became a focal point. Hence, the 
Chinese made serious efforts to bring international law into full play 
in their struggle to shake off the yoke of the unequal treaty regime 
and to create and maintain a strong and unified China—a China that 
is no longer the ―central realm‖ based on Confucian culture, but a 
nation state with a rightful place in the family of nations. 
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Today‘s achievements are built upon yesterday‘s experience. 
The Chinese are a history-conscious people. Given the state‘s pivotal 
role in advancing China‘s cultural greatness and in maintaining its 
territorial integrity, contrasted with a century of foreign humiliation, 
oppression, and domination, the Chinese sovereignty-centric 
perspective on international law is hardly surprising. Indeed, ever 
since the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent founding 
of the republic in 1911, the ability to maintain China‘s sovereignty 
over its internal and external affairs has become the raison d’être of 
any Chinese government, regardless of ideological persuasions.133 
Today, the teaching, research, and dissemination of international law 
has become part of China‘s efforts of a peaceful rise. The perennial 
concern with its status, security, and territorial sovereignty, as shaped 
by its historical legacies, still affects China‘s legal behavior in the 
conduct of its foreign relations. 
 
 
 133. It is remembered that, even during the heyday of Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, 
Chinese leaders made it clear that China‘s policy was to form an alliance on the basis of 
sovereign equality and independence rather than a petition for membership in the bloc. 
Premier Zhou Enlai repeatedly admonished that:  
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permitted to intervene in China‘s internal affairs.  
Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao [Diplomacy in Contemporary China] 30 (Xue Mouhong ed., 
1986). 
